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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is on appeal from discovery and evidentiary rulings and a final 
judgment and final order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County. Erkan Ereren, M.D., the plaintiff-appellant, appealed to the Utah 
Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §78-2-2(j). 
The Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, transferred this appeal to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction 
over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §78-2a-2(j). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether, in this substantial personal injury case, the District 
Court (Retired Judge Homer F. Wilkinson) committed reversible error in 
denying Dr. Ereren's Motion to Compel substantive responses to discovery 
requests submitted to defendant-appellee, Snowbird Corporation, and geared 
toward discovering the identity of the Snowbird skiing instructor who 
positioned Dr. Ereren in a dangerous location and toward discovering the 
identity of witnesses to the incident who would have corroborated Dr. Ereren's 
account. 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Typically, denial of a motion to compel discovery is viewed under an 
abuse-of-discretion standard. E.g., Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409, 414 
(Utah 1998), but the question here may be one of law that should be reviewed 
under a simple correctness standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994); Roundv v. Stalev, 984 P.2d 404, 406 (Utah 1999). 
1 
Prejudice is presumed if the trial court's ruling is determined to have 
been erroneous, unless it is shown that the error is harmless. "The burden of 
demonstrating that the erroneous denial of a discovery request was not 
prejudicial must ... rest with the party resisting discovery." Askew v. Hardman, 
884 P.2d 1258, 1262-63 (Utah App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 918 P.2d 
469 (Utah 1996). 
The issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by Dr. Ereren's 
filing and serving Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Defendant to Answer 
Interrogatories Set Forth in Plaintiffs First and Second Sets of Interrogatories 
and to Produce Documents Requested in Plaintiffs First and Second Requests 
for Production of Documents (R. 52-67); his Memorandum in Support of that 
Motion (R. 68-75); his Reply Memorandum in support of that Motion (R. 127-
48); Judge Wilkinson's "4-501 Ruling" on that Motion (R. 156-57); Judge 
Wilkinson's Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Defendant to Answer 
Interrogatories Set Forth in Plaintiffs First and Second Sets of Interrogatories 
and to Produce Documents Requested in Plaintiffs First and Second Request 
for Production of Documents Dated February 16, 2000 (R. 835-36); Plaintiffs 
Motion for New Trial (R. 1278-79); the Memorandum in Support of that Motion 
(R. 1280-89); the Reply Memorandum in support of that Motion (R. 1364-74); 
Judge Roger A. Livingston's minute entry denying Dr. Ereren's Motion for New 
Trial (R. 1384-85); and Judge Livingston's Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for 
New Trial (R. 1386-88). 
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2. Whether the District Court (Judge Livingston) committed reversible 
error in allowing, in the face of Rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
extrinsic "specific instance" evidence of Dr. Ereren's supposed dishonesty 
regarding the financial standing of his medical business. 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue 
may be one of abuse of discretion [e.g., State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 
1994), but may be, for this particular evidentiary issue (given the clear 
language of that Rule), de novo review of a question of law. 
This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by 
Dr. Ereren's filing and pursuit of Plaintiff's Motion in Limine (R. 973-75); the 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion in Limine (R. 976-86); the Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion in Limine (R. 1080-91); oral 
argument prior to the testimony of Snowbird's C.P.A. witness, Rick Hoffman (R. 
1414, Tr. 725-37); Judge Livingston's trial ruling on this evidentiary issue (R. 
1414, Tr. 730-37); Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial (R. 1278-79); the 
Memorandum in Support of that Motion (R. 1280-89); the Reply Memorandum 
in support of that Motion (R. 1364-74); Judge Livingston's minute entry 
denying Dr. Ereren's Motion for New Trial (R. 1384-85); and Judge Livingston's 
Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial (R. 1386-88). 
3. Whether the District Court (Judge Livingston) committed reversible 
error in allowing evidence regarding Dr. Ereren's bankruptcy and gambling 
history. 
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APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue 
appears to be one of abuse of discretion {e.g., State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 
(Utah 1994)). 
This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by 
Dr. Ereren's filing and pursuit of Plaintiffs Motion in Limine (R. 973-75); the 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion in Limine (R. 976-86); the Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion in Limine (R. 1080-91); pre-trial 
oral argument on the subject parts of that Motion (R. 1410, Tr. 30-36; 55-62; 
77-78); Judge Livingston's pre-trial ruling on the subject part of that Motion (R. 
1411, Tr. 10; 12-14); Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial (R. 1278-79); the 
Memorandum in Support of that Motion (R. 1280-89); the Reply Memorandum 
in support of that Motion (R. 1364-74); Judge Livingston's minute entry 
denying Dr. Ereren's Motion for New Trial (R. 1384-85); and Judge Livingston's 
Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial (R. 1386-88). 
4. Whether the District Court (Judge Livingston) committed reversible 
error in excluding Dr. Ereren's proffered rebuttal evidence, regarding the high 
incidence of jumping in the location where Dr. Ereren testified the ski 
instructor had positioned him, the admission of which would have made 
Dr. Ereren's account more credible and the testimony of Snowbird personnel 
less credible. 
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APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue 
appears to be one of abuse of discretion {e.g., State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 
(Utah 1994)). 
This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by oral 
argument and proffer (R. 1412, Tr. 404-12) and Judge Livingston's trial ruling 
that the proffered evidence would not be received (R. 1412, Tr. 412-15). 
5. Whether the District Court (Judge Livingston) committed reversible 
error in denying Dr. Ereren's Motion for New Trial (Judgment (R. at 1266-69) 
having been entered on the Special Verdict (R. at 1257-59), by which the jury 
reflected its acceptance of Snowbird's contention that Dr. Ereren had not 
carried his burden of proof that he was injured while in a Snowbird ski class). 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue 
appears to be whether the District Court clearly abused its discretion in 
denying the Motion for New Trial. E.g., Amoss v. Bennion, 517 P.2d 1008, 
1010 (Utah 1973). 
This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by 
Dr. Ereren's filing and pursuit of his Motion for New Trial (R. 1278-79); the 
Memorandum in Support of that Motion (R. 1280-89); the Reply Memorandum 
in support of that Motion (R. 1364-74); the Affidavit of Peter C. Collins (R. 
1290-92); the Affidavit of David M. Bernstein (R. 1357-59); Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike Affidavit of Peter C. Collins (R. 
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1360-63); the Post-Trial Affidavit of Erkan Ereren, M.D. (R. 1375-77); the 
Clarifying and Supplemental Affidavit of Peter G. Collins (R. 1378-80); Judge 
Livingston's minute entry denying Dr. Ereren's Motion for New Trial (R. 1384-
85); and Judge Livingston's Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial (R. 
1386-88). 
III. RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF 
OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL 
Rule 26(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent 
part: 
Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance 
with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any 
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the pending action, whether it 
relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking 
discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, 
including the existence, description, nature, custody, 
condition, and location of any books, documents, or 
other tangible things and the identify and location of 
persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. 
It is not ground for objection that the information 
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the 
information sought appears reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
Rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides, in pertinent part: 
Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the 
conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or 
supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of 
crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by 
extrinsic evidence. 
Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides, in pertinent part: 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
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Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61 , a new 
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or 
part of the issues, for any of the following causes...: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury 
or adverse party, or any order of the court, or 
abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(7) Error in law. 
IV, STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This Appeal is from a Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, on a 
jury verdict in favor of Snowbird, and from various rulings and orders and a 
final Order of the Third Judicial District Court denying Dr. Ereren's post-trial 
Rule 59 Motion for New Trial in this substantial negligence/personal injuiy 
action. 
B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND BRIEF HISTORY OF 
PROCEEDINGS 
On March 9, 1995, Dr. Ereren, a general surgeon, was skiing at the 
Snowbird ski resort. He alleged in his Amended Complaint (R. 30-34) and 
testified, in his deposition and in the trial proceedings held herein (on 
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February 26-March 1, 2001), that, while in a Snowbird ski class and while in 
the unsafe location in which a female Snowbird ski instructor had placed him, 
an airborne snowboarder landed on him (R. 1412, Tr. 454; 457-62). Dr. Ereren 
sustained, in the incident, a serious and debilitating neck injury that 
ultimately required surgery. 
Dr. Ereren, a native of Turkey, testified that his ski instructor was a 
female and that her first or last name was something like "Laura" or "Lauren" 
(R. 1412, Tr. 441). He also testified that a Florida radiologist, whose first or 
last name was "Scott," was, along with his ("Dr. Scott's") wife, in his ski class 
(R. 1412, Tr. 445-46; 462-63) at the time the incident occurred. 
Dr. Ereren brought this action seeking to recover compensation for his 
injuries and damages sustained in the incident. Snowbird's primary defense 
was that the incident did not occur. 
While this action was still pending before the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson, Dr. Ereren propounded discovery requests geared, among other 
things, toward discovering the identity of his ski instructor and the identities of 
"Dr. Scott" and his wife. The subject discovery requests and defendant's 
subject responses (discussed in the parties' respective papers at, e.g., R. 52-73; 
78-126; 127-48) are the following: 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify, by name, address, and 
telephone number, every ski instructor working in your 
employ as of March 8, 1995 and state, for each such person, 
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whether that person conducted any group ski lessons, at the 
Snowbird ski area, on that day. l 
OBJECTION AND ANSWER: Counsel for Defendant objects 
to information requested by Interrogatory No. 12 on the 
grounds that it is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and 
requests information which should be known to Plaintiff. 
Without waiving its objection, Defendant attaches hereto a 
copy of a daily log for Wednesday, March 8, 19952 showing 
the names of the instructors, the level of the class taught, 
and the number of students in the class. If Plaintiff can 
provide a physical description of the ski instructor and more 
specific information regarding the number of people in the 
class, the location of the class, and the names of the others 
in the class, it would assist in locating the name of the 
instructor whom Plaintiff claims to have been his on the day 
in question. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Identify, by name, address, and 
telephone number, every person who took one or more ski 
lessons at Snowbird at any time from March 5 through 
March 10, 1995, and, for each such person, state the type of 
lesson or lessons taken, the name or names of that person's 
instructor or instructors, and the date or dates on which ski 
lesson or lessons was or were taken. 
OBJECTION: Counsel for Defendant objects to this 
Interrogatory on the grounds that it is unreasonably 
burdensome, overly broad, and not reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS 
REQUEST NO. 18: All documents referenced in your 
Answers to, and/or pertinent to, any of Plaintiffs First Set of 
Interrogatories, of even date herewith. 
RESPONSE: See Answers and Objections to Interrogatories. 
1
 Dr. Ereren later informed Snowbird, through counsel, that he required identification of only 
female ski instructors. 
2
 Snowbird also produced a copy of the daily log for Thursday, March 9, 1995 (the correct date 
of the subject incident). 
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PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: State the name and address and 
phone number, as of that time, of eveiy person who gave a 
Florida address and who stayed at the Cliff Lodge and/or 
any other lodging facility operated by you at any time 
between March 1 and March 10, 1995. 
OBJECTION: Plaintiffs Interrogatory is overly broad, unduly 
burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. Moreover, Plaintiffs 
request is an invasion of the expectation of privacy that other 
hotel guests have with regard to their addresses and phone 
numbers. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: State the name and address and 
phone number as of that time, of every person who you have 
reason to think, from seminar attendee records, registration 
records, and/or otherwise, was a physician and who stayed 
at the Cliff Lodge and/or other lodging facility operated by 
you at any time between March 1 and March 10, 1995. 
OBJECTION: Plaintiffs Interrogatory is overly broad, unduly 
burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. Moreover, Plaintiffs 
request is an invasion of the expectation of privacy that other 
hotel guests have with regard to their addresses and phone 
numbers. 
Dr. Ereren's counsel then, after unsuccessfully trying informally to 
persuade Snowbird's counsel voluntarily to provide the requested information 
and documentation, and recognizing the significance of obtaining corroboration 
of Dr. Ereren's account (Snowbird's counsel had by then informed Dr. Ereren's 
counsel that there was no record of the incident), filed a Motion to Compel and 
supporting Memorandum (R. 52-73), in which he pledged not to use the 
requested information and documentation for any improper purposes and 
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agreed (R. 72), if necessary, to have a protective order entered that would limit 
the use of the information and documentation to this litigation only. 
Snowbird, stating "[o]ne of the central issues of this case is plaintiffs 
credibility" (R. 80; emphasis added), opposed that Motion, on purported bases 
including the "privacy" interests of its instructors and guests [id.]. 
Without having heard oral argument, by minute entry and without 
explanation (R. 156-57),3 Judge Wilkinson denied that Motion to Compel. 
Dr. Ereren's counsel was unsuccessful in his efforts to convince 
defendant's counsel that Judge Wilkinson's ruling was erroneous, and 
Dr. Ereren had to proceed to trial without the benefit of the facts and 
documents that would presumably have led to the discovery of the identity of 
the ski instructor and of Dr. Scott and his wife. 
Prior to trial, Dr. Ereren filed a Motion in Limine (R. 973-75), supported 
by two Memoranda (R. 576-86; 1080-91), directed mainly at preventing 
Snowbird from engaging in a campaign of character assassination and unfair 
attack on Dr. Ereren's credibility rather than fairly contesting the real issues in 
this case. Over Dr. Ereren's Motion in Limine and accepting Snowbird's 
disingenuous4 argument (R. 1410, Tr. 63-72; 75-76) that such things would 
have considerable bearing on Dr. Ereren's damages claims, Judge Livingston 
determined (R. 1410, Tr. 71; 80-82; R. 1411, Tr. 10-12) to allow presentation of 
3
 Judge Wilkinson later signed an Order (R. 833-34) that formalized that ruling. 
4
 It is noteworthy that Snowbird, showing the real reason why it wanted to introduce all the 
bad stuff it could about Dr. Ereren, acknowledged (R. 1023-24) in its Memorandum in 
Opposition to that Motion in Limine, that "[tjhe core issue for the jury in this case is whether 
Dr. Ereren's testimony as to the incident is credible." (Emphasis added.) 
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evidence regarding Dr. Ereren's gambling and bankruptcy history. Dr. Ereren 
was in fact examined about his gambling history (e.g., R. 1413, Tr. 527; 530; 
532) and about his bankruptcy {e.g., R. 1413, Tr. 531-34, including references 
to the discharging of gambling and other debts). 
During trial, Judge Livingston (R. 1414, Tr. 725-36; 752-53) allowed 
Snowbird, over Dr. Ereren's objections, and accepting Snowbird's contention 
that the evidence would go to Dr. Ereren's damages,5 to present, in conflict 
with Rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, extrinsic "specific instance" 
evidence, in the nature of the testimony of, and exhibits introduced through, 
witness Rick Hoffman, C.P.A. (R. 1414, Tr. 745-51; Exhibits 35, 36), dealing 
with Dr. Ereren's supposedly shady financial reporting practices. 
Near the beginning of his closing argument, Snowbird's counsel stated: 
T m not going to talk about damages, because I think this is a liability case...." 
R. 1414, Tr. 871 (emphasis added). 
During trial, Judge Livingston denied (R. 1412, Tr. 412-15) Dr. Ereren's 
attempt to present evidence, proffered for the purpose of rebutting Snowbird 
testimony that had already come in (purporting to show the improbability of 
Dr. Ereren's account) that skiers and snowboarders rarely, if ever, jumped in 
the general location where Dr. Ereren testified he had been placed by the ski 
5
 It is noteworthy that Snowbird's true purpose of putting such things before the jury, to attack 
Dr. Ereren's credibility, was shown by Snowbird's counsel's statement (R. 1414, Tr. 728) that 
it's clearly inappropriate from any business accounting point of view — to have two 
financial statements dated the same time, one used for a loan purpose and the other 
used for I.R.S. purposes. 
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instructor, on the basis that the identity of the proposed rebuttal witness (local 
lawyer and skier, Bob Gilchrist) had not been disclosed prior to trial. 
After deliberating approximately three hours, the jury (with two of its 
members disagreeing) answered in the negative to the first question on the 
Special Verdict form, which question asked, in essence, whether Dr. Ereren 
was telling the truth. The question was the following: 
1. Was plaintiff struck by an airborne snowboarder while 
in a ski class as he alleges at Snowbird in March, 
1995? 
R. 1257. Having so answered that question, the jury needed to answer no 
further questions on the verdict form. Snowbird had prevailed before the jury. 
On March 29, 2001, Judge Livingston entered the Judgment on Special 
Verdict (R. 1266-1269). On April 6, 2001, Dr. Ereren filed his Motion for New 
Trial (R. 1384-85) and supporting Memorandum (R. 1280-89), urging Judge 
Livingston to grant him a new trial based on such things as Judge Wilkinson's 
refusal to compel discovery responses that would presumably have led to the 
discovery of evidence corroborative of Dr. Ereren's account of the accident; 
Judge Livingston's erroneously allowing Snowbird to attack Dr. Ereren?s 
character and credibility; and Judge Livingston's refusal to allow Dr. Ereren to 
present the rebuttal evidence he sought to present. Snowbird opposed that 
Motion (R. 1294-1353). Dr. Ereren submitted a Reply Memorandum in 
Support of that Motion (R. 1364-74). Judge Livingston denied that Motion by 
Order dated May 23, 2001 (R. 1386-88). 
Dr. Ereren filed his Notice of Appeal on June 13, 2001 (R. 1394-95). 
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V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Dr. Ereren had the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that he was injured by an airborne snowboarder while he was in a 
Snowbird ski class. Snowbird denied the incident occurred, so he needed 
corroboration of his account to sustain that burden. Dr. Ereren's ski 
instructor was a female. A male radiologist named "Scott," who Dr. Ereren 
believes was from Florida, and "Dr Scott's" wife witnessed the incident. 
Snowbird presumably had information, in the nature of names, addresses, 
and/or phone numbers of all of its 1994-95 season female ski instructors, and 
of people who bought ski school tickets, people who were Florida residents, and 
people who were physicians who stayed at Snowbird during March 1-10, 1995. 
Snowbird should have been compelled to provide information regarding its ski 
instructors and such other people. It was error for Judge Wilkinson to side 
with Snowbird on those discovery issues, and his ruling in that regard was 
prejudicial error. 
2. Dr. Ereren's credibility was, as Snowbird has acknowledged (see, 
e.g., discussion at page 11 and note 4 (p. 11), supra), the central issue in this 
case. Judge Livingston erroneously allowed Snowbird to present evidence 
regarding Dr. Ereren's gambling and bankruptcy and to present extrinsic 
evidence of Dr. Ereren's supposed shady financial reporting. Such things 
supposedly (according to Snowbird's counsel's representations) dealt with 
Dr. Ereren's damages. They were all, in fact, irrelevant, under the law on 
which the juiy was correctly instructed, to damages issues. Snowbird 
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inappropriately and successfully used such things to impugn Dr. Ereren's 
credibility. It was reversible error for Judge Livingston to allow such evidence; 
and those rulings and Snowbird's conduct in presenting such evidence under 
false "damages" pretenses entitle Dr. Ereren, under Rule 59(a)(1), to a new 
trial. 
3. Judge Livingston erred, and prejudicially so, when he refused 
Dr. Ereren's request to present rebuttal evidence. Dr. Ereren's claim is that a 
snowboarder had become airborne and landed on him just below a "cat track" 
at Snowbird. Snowbird presented testimony that jumping in the area 
described by Dr. Ereren does not occur or occurs only infrequently. The 
proposed rebuttal testimony (whose necessity was unknown prior to trial -
Dr. Ereren's counsel had assumed Snowbird's witnesses would be forthright on 
the question) was important to the overall credibility of Dr. Ereren's case and 
the lack of credibility of Snowbird's case and should have been permitted. 
4. Judge Livingston erred in denying Dr. Ereren's Motion for New 
Trial. 
5. This Court should order a new trial, should direct that Snowbird 
be required to provide substantive responses to the subject discovery requests, 
and should direct that, on retrial, Snowbird not be allowed to present evidence 
of Dr. Ereren's gambling or bankruptcy history or of his supposedly 
questionable financial reporting practices. 
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VI. ARGUMENT 
A. JUDGE WILKINSON ERRONEOUSLY DENIED DR. EREREN'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL. THAT RULING CONSTITUTES 
REVERSIBLE ERROR AND ENTITLES DR. EREREN TO A NEW 
TRIAL. 
The subject discovery requests, set forth at pages 8-10 hereof, were 
geared toward discovering information crucial to Dr. Ereren's case. As the 
Court will readily observe, those requests were directed toward determining the 
identity of the ski instructor who placed Dr. Ereren where she placed him and 
the identities of "Dr. Scott" and his wife, the people who (R. 1412, Tr. at 462), 
along with the ski instructor, were present when the incident occurred. 
Without corroborating evidence from anyone who was present when the 
incident occurred, Dr. Ereren had the most difficult task, which the jury 
determined had not been accomplished, of proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the incident had occurred. 
Snowbird's responses to the subject discovery requests (also set forth on 
pages 8-10 hereof) are most unsatisfactory. The only supposedly substantive 
response (set forth in the Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 12 of 
Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories) is the reference to the contents of the 
March 8, 1995 ski instructor daily log provided by Snowbird (Exs. 10, 10A). 
(Snowbird later provided a daily log for the date of the incident, March 9, 1995 
(Exs. 9, 9A). Snowbird also later provided a photo array (Ex. 1) of some of its 
female ski instructors who taught during the 1994-95 season.) 
The unsatisfactoriness and incompleteness of Snowbird's response is 
demonstrated by the fact that the Snowbird ski school director (R. 1412, Tr. 
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359), Steve Bills, acknowledged that the daily logs are not (R. 1412, Tr. 375-76) 
necessarily completely accurate; by the fact that Shirley Durtschi, a Snowbird 
ski instructor during the 1994-95 season (R. 1412, Tr. 299) , testified that 
other records, prepared by individual ski instructors and turned in at the end 
of each teaching day, in a different format from the daily logs produced by 
Snowbird, reflecting the identities of instructors and the numbers of students 
taught on that day, are created by the instructors and then turned in to 
Snowbird (R. 1412, Tr. 305-307);6 by the fact that Dr. Ereren did the best he 
could with respect to providing, many years after the incident occurred, a 
physical description of his teacher {e.g., R. 1412, Tr. 441-42; 448), in response 
to Snowbird's suggestion in its Objection and Answer (p. 9 hereof); by the fact 
that a photo array provided by Snowbird (Ex. 1) included the faces of only 42 of 
the probably more than 75 female instructors who taught at Snowbird during 
the 1994-95 season (R. 1411, Tr. at 231); by the fact that Georgia Dumais, a 
long-time (R. 1412, Tr. 350-51) Snowbird ski instructor, could not recognize 
the faces of all of those 42 instructors (R. 1412, Tr. 336); by the fact that 
Ms. Durtschi mistakenly identified one of the instructors whose face appears in 
Exhibit 1 as someone named "Laura" (R. 1412, Tr. 303-05); by the fact that the 
face of Nancy "Highpockets" Thorson, the instructor who taught Dr. Ereren's 
wife (in a different class) on the day in question (R. 1412, Tr. 373), does not 
6
 It is noteworthy that Ms. Durtschi testified that she believes that Snowbird keeps those 
records indefinitely or for at least six years (R. 1412, Tr. 307; 318-19), that the trial of this case 
took place within six years of the date of the incident, and that Snowbird never produced such 
documents. 
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appear in that photo array (R. 1412, 367-68); by the fact that Dr. Ereren 
testified (R. 1414, Tr. 442) that neither Ms. Dumais nor Ms. Durtschi (the 
instructors that Snowbird claimed were the only candidates, based on the daily 
logs, for the position) appeared to be the instructor in question; and by the fact 
that both Ms. Dumais (e.g., R. 1412, Tr. 373) and Ms. Durtschi (id.) denied that 
they were the ski instructor in question. 
If Dr. Ereren, who (R. 72) agreed to refrain from using information 
obtained for any improper purpose and for any purpose other than this 
litigation, had been given appropriate access to the information requested, he 
would presumably have been able to determine the true identity of the 
instructor. 
Snowbird provided no information, other than limited and unsatisfactory 
documentation (R. 1414, Tr. 782-83) regarding medical conferences,7 in 
response to Dr. Ereren's discovery requests that sought to learn the identities 
and whereabouts of Dr. Scott and his wife. Interrogatory No. 14 of Dr. Ereren's 
First Set of Interrogatories and Interrogatories Nos. 1 and 2 of Dr. Ereren's 
Second Set of Interrogatories (pp. 9-10 hereof) were geared toward determining 
the identity of those witnesses. Nowhere in Snowbird's objections to those 
requests is it suggested that the information sought by Dr. Ereren was not 
available to Snowbird. 
7
 No addresses for the organizations sponsoring those conferences were provided by Snowbird 
(R. 1412, Tr. 449). Dr. Ereren's own considerable efforts to find "Dr. Scott" are discussed at R. 
1412, Tr. 446-49. 
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Dr. Ereren sought, in Interrogatory No. 14 of his First Set of 
Interrogatories, in connection with his quest to locate those witnesses, 
information regarding persons who had taken ski lessons at Snowbird on the 
day in question. Snowbird's contention that the request was "not reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence" is as wrongheaded 
as its Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 12 of Dr. Ereren?s First Set of 
Interrogatories (the one geared toward determining the identity of the ski 
instructor in question) that that information "should be known to Plaintiff." 
Snowbird's Objection, on the basis of supposed "invasion of privacy" (among 
other untenable supposed bases), to Interrogatories Nos. 1 and 2 of 
Dr. Ereren's Second Set of Interrogatories, which sought information regarding 
people who gave Florida addresses ("Dr. Scott" was, to Dr. Ereren's recollection 
(R. 1412, Tr. 445-46), a radiologist from Florida) and who stayed at Snowbird 
during the subject period, and regarding physicians who stayed at Snowbird 
during that period, demonstrates Snowbird's fundamental misunderstanding, 
or intentional distortion, of the rules governing discovery. If Snowbird were 
correct in its "invasion of privacy" contention, any party to any lawsuit could 
successfully refuse to provide information and documentation that would help 
the opposition, simply on the basis that a non-party witness whose identity 
would, through the discovery process, come to the attention of the requesting 
party might be bothered or inconvenienced. That is not and cannot be the law. 
It should be noted, in connection with the matter of information and 
documents pertinent to the identities of "Dr. Scott" and his wife, and in light of 
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the breadth of Dr. Ereren's request for information and documentation geared 
toward discovering the identities of those witnesses, that Snowbird never 
produced a document that by Snowbird's own acknowledgment once existed 
and that would conceivably have shed considerable light on the identities of 
"Dr. Scott" and his wife. Snowbird keeps records reflecting the purchase of ski 
school tickets. Exhibit 2 A, also enlarged as Exhibit 2, show the names of 
people who bought ski tickets on March 8, 1995 (R. 1412, Tr. 363). 
Dr. Ereren's name appears on that document. Ski school tickets bought one 
day can be used on that day or on any subsequent day (e.g., R. 1412, Tr. 363-
64 (testimony of Snowbird's Steve Bills)). Dr. Ereren testified (R. 1413, Tr. 481) 
that he believes that he bought a ski school ticket on March 9 th for his 
March 9 th instruction. Dr. Scott, with whom Dr. Ereren testified he only skied 
on March 9 th (Tr. 444), may well have bought his ski school ticket on 
March 9 th. The document reflecting ski school tickets bought on March 9 th has 
never been produced by Snowbird, although Mr. Bills (R. 1412, Tr. 365) 
testified that he believes that Snowbird located that document. Robert Black, 
Snowbird's "director of mountain operations" (R. 1411, Tr. 209), testified (R. 
1414, Tr. 801-02) that the hard copy of that document was apparently lost 
during a Snowbird move. Mr. Black also acknowledged that that is a 
computer-generated document (R. 1414, Tr. 802). Computer-generated 
documents can almost always be re-created, and Snowbird gave no explanation 
for why the one in question could not be re-created (if, in fact, and contrary to 
Mr. Bills's stated belief, it had not indeed been located). 
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Rule 26(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, set forth verbatim at p. 6 
hereof, makes clear the breadth of the discovery rules. Snowbird's contention 
that Dr. Ereren was not entitled to discover information reasonably calculated 
to lead to the discovery of the identity of the ski instructor and the identities of 
Dr. Scott and his wife, in the face of the language of the Rule and the liberal 
approach to discovery that forms the jurisprudential basis for the Rule, holds 
no water. Judge Wilkinson's ruling that Dr. Ereren was not entitled to the 
subject information and documentation was flatly erroneous. 
This Court, in Askew v. Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258, 1262-63 (Utah App. 
1994), rev'd on other grounds, 918 P.2d 469 (Utah 1996), made it abundantly 
clear that an erroneous discovery ruling that prevents a party from obtaining 
discoverable information is presumed to be prejudicial error, entitling the 
requesting party, if unsuccessful at trial, to a new trial unless the withholding 
party can sustain its burden of showing that its withholding of requested 
information was not prejudicial. This Court held, in Askew: 
[T]he usual harmless-error analysis is inapposite where the 
trial court has erroneously denied a discovery request. In 
such situations, this court is required to presume prejudice 
unless it is shown that the denial was harmless. Weahkee v. 
Norton, 621 F.2d 1080, 1083 (10th Cir. 1980); accord 
Shaklee Corp. v. Gunnell, 748 F.2d 548, 550 (10th Cir. 
1984). Prejudice is presumed because to require the 
requesting party to show that the error was harmful would 
place the requesting party in the untenable position of 
having to demonstrate that the contents of inaccessible 
information would have affected the outcome of a case. 
Because the requesting party does not have the information, 
he or she will never be able to demonstrate that the trial 
court's erroneous denial of a discovery request was anything 
but harmless.611 The burden of demonstrating that the 
erroneous denial of a discovery request was not prejudicial 
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must therefore rest with the party resisting discovery. See, 
In re California Public Utilities Common, 892 F.2d 778, 783-
84 (9th Cir. 1989). Where we cannot determine from the 
record whether the requested documents might have 
changed the outcome of the trial, we cannot say that the 
error was harmless. Weahkee, 621 F.2d at 1083; Shaklee 
Corp., 748 F.2d at 550. Because defendant has not 
demonstrated that the denial of plaintiffs discovery request 
was not prejudicial, and because we cannot determine from 
the record whether the requested documents would have 
changed the outcome of the case, the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in denying plaintiffs discovery request. 
fal
 In some settings, a trial judge might examine documents 
in camera to determine the import of their contents. 
However, this approach is unsatisfactory in this context. We 
are concerned not only with whether the requested 
information on its face might change the outcome of the 
trial, but also with what impact discovery of that information 
might have had on trial counsel's overall preparation and 
conduct of the trial. Only in the most clear-cut cases could 
any judge, without the benefit of trial counsel's thinking and 
strategy, make a determination as to whether information 
and the documents could aid the requesting party. 
(Emphasis added.) 
It is difficult to conceive of a situation more tailored to the rule of Askew 
than is the instant situation. Snowbird's primary defense to Dr. Ereren's 
claim, and the basis of the jury's verdict, was that the incident never occurred. 
See, e.g., footnote 4, supra, page 11; and see the one question answered by the 
jury on the verdict form (R. 1257). The very purpose of the subject discovery 
requests was to obtain corroboration of Dr. Ereren's account. Snowbird cannot 
carry its burden, under Askew, of showing that Judge Wilkinson's discovery 
ruling, patently erroneous under either an abuse-of-discretion standard or a 
"correctness" standard, was harmless. This Court should, on the strength of 
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this Point A of this Argument alone - and regardless of its analysis of the 
balance of this Argument - order, as this Court did in Askew, a new trial. 
B. JUDGE LIVINGSTON COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
ALLOWING, IN THE FACE OF RULE 608(b) OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF EVIDENCE, EXTRINSIC "SPECIFIC INSTANCE" 
EVIDENCE OF DR. EREREN'S SUPPOSED DISHONESTY 
REGARDING THE FINANCIAL STANDING OF HIS MEDICAL 
BUSINESS. 
Rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, provides, in pertinent part: 
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the 
purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, 
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may 
not be proved by extrinsic evidence. 
(Emphasis added.) 
"Extrinsic evidence" is "evidence offered other than through the witness 
himself." 1 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence, §49 (4th ed. 1992). 
Dr. Ereren has been convicted of no crime. Accordingly, and as 
explained to Judge Livingston by Dr. Ereren's counsel (R. 1414, Tr. 725-26; 
733; 736-37), it was impermissible, under Rule 608(b), for Snowbird to put on 
extrinsic evidence, through its C.P.A. witness, Rick Hoffman, of Dr. Ereren's 
supposed improprieties and dishonesty (in this case in which Snowbird hung 
its defense on Dr. Ereren's supposed lack of credibility), regarding his use of 
two sets of numbers concerning his medical business, one for internal and 
I.R.S. purposes and one for use in obtaining loans. The subject parts of 
Mr. Hoffman's testimony are set forth at R. 1414, Tr. 745-53. The subject 
exhibits are Exhibits 35 and 36. The focus of Mr. Hoffman's work was on the 
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years 1991-94 (R. 1414, Tr. 743), a period prior to the occurrence of the 
subject incident. 
This was clearly extrinsic evidence and it was clearly offered for the 
purpose of attacking Dr. Ereren's credibility. Snowbird's counsel argued in the 
pre-trial proceedings and at trial, and is expected to argue in this Appeal, that 
such evidence was offered for purposes of contesting Dr. Ereren's damages 
claim, and it was on that basis (R. 1414, Tr. 730-31; 735) that Judge 
Livingston allowed this evidence; but there is no logical link between 
presentation of this kind of evidence and the amount of Dr. Ereren's damages 
sustained as a result of the subject incident. The subject jury instructions on 
damages, to which Snowbird stipulated, are the following: 
Instruction No. 33 
The total amount of a plaintiffs past special damages is the 
amount that will reasonably compensate him for (1) the cost 
of medical, surgical, and other health care and related 
expenses reasonably required and actually provided in the 
diagnosis, care, and treatment of him to the present time; 
plus (2) his loss of income and earning capacity to date. 
Instruction No. 35 
The total amount of a plaintiff s future special damages is 
the amount that will reasonably compensate him for his loss 
of future income and earning capacity. 
R. 1243, 1245 (some emphasis added). 
Not only did the subject extrinsic evidence have nothing to do with 
Dr. Ereren's damages. Snowbird's counsel (R. 1414, Tr. 728) let slip, in his 
remarks concerning Mr. Hoffman's testimony quoted in footnote 5, supra, p. 
12, the real reason for wanting to get this evidence in front of the jury. Also, 
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after all the discussions, prior to trial and during the trial, about the supposed 
legitimacy of getting into such things, Snowbird's counsel said nothing 
whatsoever, in his closing argument, regarding Dr. Ereren's damages. 
The real purpose for Snowbird's introduction of the subject evidence was 
to attack Dr. Ereren's credibility. The evidence was clearly extrinsic. Its 
admission was erroneous. Judge Livingston had no discretion to allow it. If he 
did, he abused that discretion. The evidence, which went to the heart of 
Snowbird's Dr. Ereren's-lack-of-credibility defense, was not harmless. In any 
event, Snowbird's introduction of the evidence, under the false pretense of 
using it to attack Dr. Ereren's damages case, constituted Rule 59(a)(1) 
"irregularity in the proceedings ... of an adverse party." Dr. Ereren is, on the 
basis of all or any of these bases, entitled to a new trial. 
C. JUDGE LIVINGSTON COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
ALLOWING EVIDENCE REGARDING DR. EREREN'S 
BANKRUPTCY AND GAMBLING HISTORY. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, set forth verbatim at page 6 
hereof, provides that evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Dr. Ereren 
acknowledges that, unlike Rule 608(b), dealing with extrinsic evidence such as 
that presented by and through Mr. Hoffman, Rule 403 allows a trial court to 
exercise its discretion in determining whether the probative value of evidence is 
outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial nature. Evidence of Dr. Ereren's 
gambling history and of the fact that he sought protection of the federal 
bankruptcy laws (if, indeed, even relevant and if, indeed, it should not have 
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been excluded under Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence) was unfairly 
prejudicial, and extraordinarily so, on its face; its probative value, if any, was 
minimal. Such things, like Mr. Hoffman's evidence, were ostensibly offered by 
Snowbird, and allowed by Judge Livingston, on the supposed basis that they 
would assist Snowbird in defending against Dr. Ereren's damages claim. As 
with the evidence introduced by and through Mr. Hoffman, however, they had 
nothing to do with Dr. Ereren's damages claims. Dr. Ereren won and, more 
often, lost, as a high-stakes gambler, both before and after the subject incident. 
He never claimed that the subject incident caused him to go into bankruptcy. 
Snowbird elicited testimony from Dr. Ereren (R. 1413, Tr. 531-34) that he had 
discharged, through his bankruptcy, debts including but not limited to 
gambling debts. The true purpose of Snowbird's wanting to get into 
Dr. Ereren's gambling history and bankruptcy was to prejudice the jury against 
Dr. Ereren. Again, Snowbird's counsel argued nothing about Dr. Ereren's 
damages in his closing argument. It was an abuse of discretion for Judge 
Livingston to allow evidence of Dr. Ereren's gambling and bankruptcy, that 
abuse of discretion was not harmless, and that abuse of discretion, as well as 
Snowbird's conduct (under Rule 59(a)(1)) in presenting that evidence, entitles 
Dr. Ereren to a new trial, 
D. JUDGE LIVINGSTON COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
EXCLUDING DR. EREREN'S PROFFERED REBUTTAL 
EVIDENCE REGARDING THE HIGH INCIDENCE OF JUMPING IN 
THE LOCATION WHERE DR. EREREN TESTIFIED THE SKI 
INSTRUCTOR HAD POSITIONED HIM. 
During trial, and in support of its position that Dr. Ereren's account of 
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what had occurred was most improbable, Snowbird personnel (Bob Black (R. 
1411, Tr. 241-43; 245; 249-50) and Shirley Durtschi (R. 1412, Tr. 310-11)) 
testified that the area described by Dr. Ereren is one where skiers and 
snowboarders infrequently, if ever, jump. Dr. Ereren and his counsel, who 
from the highway witnessed a number of people jumping in that area during a 
later, short visit to Snowbird (R. 1412, Tr. 455-56), were surprised by that 
testimony. Dr. Ereren attempted to introduce rebuttal evidence and proffered 
that that evidence (R. 1412, Tr. 404-06; 410; 412), testimony from local lawyer 
and skier, Bob Gilchrist, would be that, for years and years, Mr. Gilchrist had 
seen people frequently jumping in that area. Judge Livingston ruled (R. 1412, 
Tr. 412) that that rebuttal evidence would not be permitted. 
The proffered evidence was genuine rebuttal evidence which would have 
supported Dr. Ereren's case and would have appropriately negatively impacted 
the credibility of the Snowbird personnel who testified regarding the supposed 
improbability of Dr. Ereren's account. Dr. Ereren did not know that Snowbird 
people, who had never been asked about this specific subject during their 
depositions, would testify falsely on this subject until trial. Judge Livingston 
abused his discretion in refusing the proffered rebuttal testimony, and that 
abuse of discretion, given the critical issue of credibility in this trial, entitles 
Dr. Ereren to a new trial. 
E. JUDGE LIVINGSTON ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
DR. EREREN'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, 
The erroneous rulings of Judge Wilkinson and of Judge Livingston, and 
the conduct of Snowbird, discussed hereinabove, were the focus of Dr. Ereren's 
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Motion for a New Trial and supporting Memorandum (R. 1278-89) and Reply 
Memorandum (R. 1364-74). Under Rule 59(a)(1) and/or Rule 59(a)(7) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Dr. Ereren was, and is, entitled to a new trial. 
Rule 59(a)(1) provides that a new trial may be granted based on: 
[Ijrregularity in the proceedings of the court ... or adverse 
party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by 
which any party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
Rule 59(a)(7) provides, as another basis for the granting of a new trial, 
"error in law." Under either of these grounds, as the foregoing discussion, 
Dr. Ereren's counsel trusts, makes clear, a new trial should have been granted; 
and Judge Livingston abused his discretion in denying Dr. Ereren's Motion for 
a New Trial. 
VIL CONCLUSION 
By all reasonable analysis, if Dr. Ereren's account of what occurred is 
true, he is entitled to substantial compensation from Snowbird. Ms. Durtschi 
acknowledged (R. 1412, Tr. 459-61; 477-78) that it would be "unsafe'' for a ski 
instructor to position someone in the kind of location where Dr. Ereren testified 
he was placed by the ski instructor. There was no testimony to the contrary. 
The Snowbird personnel who were asked agreed that a trust relationship exists 
between a skier and his instructor. E.g., R. 1411, Tr. 228; R. 1414, Tr. 235. 
No one disputed that proposition. No one suggested that Dr. Ereren was 
negligent. No questions regarding Dr. Ereren's putative negligence appeared on 
the Special Verdict form (R. 1257-59). The relative percentages of fault of 
Snowbird and of the unidentified snowboarder, who was never apprehended, 
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would have been a subject of fair debate among the jurors, but it is virtually 
inconceivable that a jury would have found that the Snowbird instructor's 
placing Dr. Ereren in that location amounted to an "inherent risk of skiing" or 
that the snowboarder had 100% of the causal fault or anything close to that. 
Dr. Ereren testified (R. 1412, Tr. 463-64) that he had played in "physical" 
basketball leagues and that he thought, in the immediate aftermath of the 
incident, that he would be okay. But he got worse, and the evidence from his 
neurosurgeon (R. 1413, Tr. 555-94), from his neurologist (R. 1413, Tr. 616-43), 
and from himself {e.g., R. 1412, Tr. 473-74) was that he had sustained a neck 
injury requiring that he undergo surgery, that he could and should no longer 
perform most of the kinds of surgeries he had performed prior to the incident, 
that he was in pain, and that his condition was permanent. That evidence was 
unrebutted. Snowbird called no medical witness. 
Dr. Ereren's economic loss expert testified (R. 1413, Tr. 699) that 
Dr. Ereren had sustained several million dollars in economic losses. It was 
stipulated (R. 1244) that he had sustained in excess of $46,000 in surgical and 
other medical expenses by reason of his neck injury. Dr. Ereren?s claim for 
general damages was, and is, also substantial. 
This Court, in Roundv v. Stalev, 984 P.2d 404 (Utah App. 1999), ordered 
a new trial in a situation in which the defendant wrongfully refused to produce 
a surveillance video of the plaintiff (superficially viewed, something that would 
impact only questions of damages) in a case in which, by virtue of its 
determination of the liability issues, the jury never reached the question of 
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damages. In Roundv, this Court acknowledged (id. at 409) that "a 
determination of liability in this case hinged on the parties' credibility." This 
case also hinges on credibility. 
Without the evidence that this Court must assume, under Askew, would 
have been produced had Snowbird voluntarily complied with, or been ordered 
to comply with, Dr. Ereren's subject discovery requests, Dr. Ereren had to go to 
trial without corroborative evidence. Dr. Ereren's credibility was directly 
attacked by Snowbird's introduction of extrinsic evidence prohibited by Rule 
608(b) and by Snowbird's introduction of evidence, which Judge Livingston 
should have excluded, concerning his bankruptcy and gambling history. 
Dr. Ereren's credibility would have been enhanced and the credibility of 
Snowbird would have been appropriately undermined had the Court allowed 
his proffered rebuttal evidence. 
This Court, as mandated by Askew and on the strength of the Roundv 
analysis, and based on the erroneous rulings of Judge Wilkinson and Judge 
Livingston and the conduct of Snowbird, and in the interest of justice, should 
order a new trial. This Court should also by its opinion make it clear that, on 
remand, Snowbird must be required to produce the information and 
documentation that are subjects of the discovery requests at issue and should 
direct that, on retrial, Snowbird be prohibited from introducing impermissible 
extrinsic evidence and impermissible evidence regarding Dr. Ereren's gambling 
and bankruptcy history. 
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VIII. NO ADDENDUM NECESSARY 
Dr. Ereren's undersigned counsel represents that no addendum is 
necessary under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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